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Abstract
In this paper, we analyse inspection games with an evolutionary
perspective. In our evolutionary inspection game with a large pop-
ulation, each individual is not a rational payoff maximiser, but pe-
riodically updates his strategy if he perceives that other individuals’
strategies are more successful than his own, namely strategies are sub-
ject to the evolutionary pressure. We develop this game into a few
directions. Firstly, social norms are incorporated into the game and
we analyse how social norms may influence individuals’ propensity to
engage in criminal behaviour. Secondly, a forward-looking inspector is
considered, namely, the inspector chooses the level of law enforcement
whilst taking into account the effect that this choice will have on future
crime rates. Finally, the game is extended to the one with continuous
strategy spaces.
Key words: inspection game, social norms, crime rate, law enforcement
1 Introduction
An inspection game is a non-cooperative game whose players are often called
an inspector and an inspectee. It models a situation where the inspectee,
which may be an individual, an organisation, a state or a country, is obliged
to follow certain regulations but has an incentive to violate them. The
inspector tries to minimise the impact of such violations by means of in-
spections that uncover them. Typically an inspection game has a mixed
equilibrium.
Inspection games have a wide variety of applications including arms
control [12, 10, 11, 39], auditing of accounts [41, 19, 20], tax inspection
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[58, 54, 37, 51, 50, 1], environmental protection [56, 67, 38, 6], quality con-
trol in supply chains [52, 61, 40], stockkeeping [27] and communication in-
frastructures [34, 23]. Some of these are surveyed in e.g. [15, 7, 12, 16].
The research on inspection games can contribute to the construction of an
effective inspection plan for the inspector when an illegal action is executed
strategically.
This subject has been investigated quite extensively during the last five
decades. Still, it continues to draw attention. Throughout the 1960s and
the three decades that ensured, the underlying motivation was the cold war
between the US and the Soviet Union and the desire to monitor the various
arms control agreements that were signed by the two superpowers. Ana-
lytically, these settings led quite naturally to two-person game formulations
with various assumptions about the strategy sets that were feasible to each
of the two parties. Since the early 1990s, attention has shifted to other di-
rections and new circumstances require moving from two-person to n-person
formulations, from zero-sum games to non-zero-sums.
In the initial work done by Dresher [26] and Kuhn [43], they considered
sequential inspection games for the treaty of arms reduction where one player
wishes to violate the treaty in secret while the other player makes a plan for
inspection. In a sequential inspection game, an inspector has to distribute
a given number of inspections over a larger number of inspection periods in
order to detect an illegal act that an inspectee, who can count the inspector’s
visits, performs in at most one of these periods. Maschler [46] generalized
Dresher’s modelling. In Maschler’s model, the inspectee (violator) must
pay a unit penalty if the violation is exposed by an inspection, but he can
escape the exposure by a side payment of penalty γ. Dresher discusses
special cases of γ = 1/2 and γ = 1, and Maschler considered the general
case 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. Diamond [25] and Ruckle [55] also studied two-person zero-
sum games between an inspector and an inspectee and a pair of equilibrium
strategies was sought.
In the setting of inspections by the customs against smugglers, Thomas
and Nisgav [63] extended Maschler’s model to a game in which customs
keeps watch on illegal actions of a smuggler by using one or two patrol
boats, and the number of boats affects the reward obtained on the capture
of the smuggler. They formulated the problem as a multi-stage game, and
adopted a numerical method where a one-stage matrix game is repeatedly
solved.
Baston and Bostock [17] provided a closed form solution of Thomas and
Nisgav’s model. They also relaxed the assumption of perfect-capture. The
perfect capture assumption means that the inspector certainly captures the
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inspectee (violators or smugglers) when both players meet. They assumed
that the capture probability depends on the number of patrol boats. Ger-
naev [33] extended Baston and Bostock’s work to a model with three patrol
boats. Sakaguchi [60] and Von Stengel [65] studied inspection games with
several smuggling opportunities in a perfect-capture model. Ferguson and
Melolidakis [31] extended further this model by assuming that the smuggler
can avoid capture by paying some cost γ ≤ 1. If he is captured on his
smuggling, the smuggler must pay unit cost.
Since the inspection resources (inspection personnel, equipments or time)
are usually limited and complete surveillance is not possible, it is natural
to include the first kind error (probability of a false alarm) α given that
the inspectee acts legally and the second kind error (probability of non-
detection) β that no alarm is raised given that the inspectee acts illegally.
This kind inspection game is referred to as an imperfect inspection game,
see e.g. Rothenstein and Zamir [53], Canty, Rothenstein and Avenhaus [22].
Rothenstein and Zamir [53] extended Diamond’s model [25] by including
fixed errors of the first and second kind for a single inspection. Canty,
Rothenstein and Avenhaus [22] solved a non-sequential inspection game with
first and second kind errors based on a fixed detection time goal and obtained
some special solutions for the sequential case.
It is worth noting that the papers cited above study zero-sum inspection
games. However under certain circumstances, one cannot justify the zero-
sum assumption and non-zero-sum formulations are presented, e.g. in Aven-
haus and von Stengel [14], Avenhaus, Von Stengel and Zamir [16], Avenhaus
[8], Avenhaus and Canty [9], Kolokoltsov and Malafeyev [42], Avenhaus and
Kilgour [13], Hohzaki [39] and Deutsch, Golany and Rothblum [24].
Avenhaus [8], Kolokoltsov and Malafeyev [42] presented a one-inspector-
one-inspectee non-zero-sum one-step imperfect inspection game, where the
inspector has a non-detection probability β. Avenhaus and Canty [9] con-
sidered a similar model in a sequential setting, and subject to both kind
errors. In these works, they gave an explicit form of the unique Nash equi-
librium of this game, i.e. a mixed strategy profile (p∗, q∗), where p∗ is the
optimal probability with which the inspector inspects and q∗ is the optimal
probability with which the inspectee acts illegally.
Avenhaus, Von Stengel and Zamir [16] considered a one-inspector-one
-inspectee non-zero-sum imperfect inspection game, where the inspector has
a probability of a false alarm α and a probability of non-detection β, and the
inspectee has a behavior strategy (q, ω), where q is the probability for acting
illegally and ω is a probability distribution on violation procedure given the
inspectee acts illegally. They decomposed this game into two games which
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are solved separately and the solution of one game is a parameter of the sec-
ond game. First, assuming that the inspectee acts illegally, they formulated
a zero-sum game where the inspector faces a hypothesis testing problem δ
and the inspectee chooses an optimal violation mechanism ω. That is, for
any test δ, the inspectee will choose a violation mechanism ω∗ to maximise
the non-detection probability β(δ, ω). On the side of the inspector, first he
chooses a fixed false alarm probability α and consider only those tests that
result in this error probability. Then he will choose a test δ∗ that minimizes
the worst-case non-detection probability β(δ∗, ω∗). Namely, in equilibrium,
the non-detection probability is represented by β(α) := minδ maxω β(δ, ω).
Then they solved the original non-zero-sum game to get the optimal false
alarm α∗ for the inspector and optimal probability q∗ for the inspectee acting
illegally.
Avenhaus and Kilgour [13] studied a one-inspector-two-inspectees non-
zero-sum inspection game with imperfect inspections. They found a Nash
equilibrium where the inspector divides his inspection effort among two in-
spectees. Further, they showed that when detection functions (probability
of detecting), as functions of inspection effort, are convex, inspection effort
should be concentrated on one inspectee chosen at random, but when de-
tection functions are concave it should be spread deterministically over the
inspectees.
Hohzaki [39] extended Avenhaus and Kilgour’s model [13] to a one-
inspector-n-inspectees non-zero-sum inspection game, where the inspectee
k, k ∈ [1, n], has lk facilities which are set as targets for the inspection and
the inspector has a budget constraint C > 0. He decomposed this non-zero-
sum inspection game into two optimisation problems: an optimal assignment
problem of inspection staff and an optimal division problem of the budget.
For an optimal assignment problem of inspection staff, he started with as-
suming resource yk is assigned to the inspectee k, with
∑n
k=1 yk = C. An
feasible assignment plan of the inspection staff xk = {xki ≥ 0, i = 1, .., lk}
must satisfy
∑lk
i=1 c
k
i x
k
i = yk, then the inspector aims to minimise the non-
detection probability β(yk) over feasible assignment plans x
k, k ∈ [1, n].
Further, knowing the minimum non-detection probability β∗(yk), he ob-
tained a Nash equilibrium (y∗ = {y∗1, . . . , y∗n}, q∗ = {q∗1, . . . , q∗n}) of pure
strategies of the inspector and mixed strategies of the inspectees by solving
an optimal division problem of the budget. Deutsch, Golany and Rothblum
[24] considered a similar non-zero-sum game with single inspector multiple
inspectees and provided closed-form expressions of Nash equilibria.
Gianini, Mayer, Coquil, Kosch and Brunie [34] generalised the model by
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Avenhaus [8], Kolokoltsov and Malafeyev [42] to m-inspectors-n-inspectees
one-step non-zero sum games. In this game, they assumed the m inspectors
are uncoordinated and the n inspectees are non-interacting. Inspectors have
probability p to perform the inspection. If an inspector decides for the in-
spection, then the inspection will be performed on a single randomly chosen
inspectee. Given the inspection, each inspectee will have probability 1/2 to
be inspected. The inspectees have respectively probabilities q1, . . . , qn of act-
ing illegally. They provided explicit form of mixed strategies (p∗, q∗1, . . . , q∗n)
for these games.
In the setting of production economics, inspection games are modified
in the way that a third player, symbolizing a mediator and coordinating the
inspector and the inspectee, is introduced to guarantee that the inspector
and the inspectee behave in accordance with the objectives of the firm. For
detailed discussion, see e.g. Borch [19], Anderson and Young [3], Avenhaus,
Von Stengel and Zamir [16], Fandel/Trockel [28], Fandel/Trockel [29, 30].
Another direction of modification of inspection games is to consider the
inspector as a Stackelberg leader of the game, see more e.g. in Andreozzi [5,
4]. McEneaney and Singh [47] studied inspections with spatially nontrivial
distributions. A very much related model to the inspection game is the
patrolling game which involves the scheduling and deployment of patrols,
for discussions on the patrolling game see e.g. [2] and references therein.
Inspection games are also applied to law enforcement. Tsebelis [64] first
used inspection games to model phenomena in criminal justice. According
to Tsebelis [64], modifying the size of the penalty does not affect the fre-
quency of crime commitment at equilibrium, but rather the frequency of
law enforcement. Pradiptyo [48] refined the inspection game proposed by
Tesbelis, by using empirical evidence from various studies, which primarily
conducted in the UK, to re-construct the game. They found that an increase
in the severity of punishment will reduce the likelihood of the enforcement of
the law. Instead of increasing the severity of punishment, theoretically, the
authority may reduce individuals’ offending behaviour by providing finan-
cial compensation to those who do not have criminal records. This is widely
known as crime prevention initiative. Interesting psychological analysis of
the logic and rationale employed by the players in such game scenarios can
be found in Rauhut [49]. Altruistic punishment in promoting cooperation
in a large population can be found e.g. in [59] and [32] and many references
therein.
In the work by Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull [44], they analysed the
interplay between social norms and economics incentives in the context of
work decisions in the modern welfare state. Each individual either works
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full-time or does not work at all. Each individual chooses to work if and
only if his choice results in higher utility than living off the transfer, i.e.
u[(1− a)w] > u(b) + µ− v(x),
where u : [0,∞) → [0,∞) is the utility function, a ∈ (0, 1) is the tax
rate, b ∈ R+ is the amount of government transfer, w ∈ [0,∞) is the
wage, x ∈ [0, 1] is the population share living on the transfer, v(x) is a
decreasing function describing the disutility from accepting the transfer, µ
is the utility difference between the leisure of living on the transfer and the
intrinsic utility that one may derive from work life. They proved that for
every tax rate a ∈ (0, 1), transfer b ∈ [0,∞) and expected population share
x ∈ [0, 1] of the transfer recipients, there exists a unique critical wage rate w∗
such that all individuals with lower wages than w∗ choose not to work and
those with higher wages than w∗ choose to work. Further, an equilibrium
population share x∗ ∈ [0, 1] of transfer recipients can be obtained by solving
the equation
x = Φ
(
u−1[u(b) + µ− v(x)]
1− a
)
where Φ : [0,∞) → [0, 1] is a continuously differentiable cumulative proba-
bility distribution function of wages for each individual and u−1 denotes the
inverse function of u. By considering the so-called government balance re-
quirement, that is public transfer spending is equal to public revenues from
the wage tax, they showed some interesting observations on the relation
between the tax rate a and the transfer b.
In this paper, we will investigate a few imperfect inspection games in
different settings. First, we show that the canonical two-player inspection
game can be generalised to situations where the inspector is responsible for
inspecting large populations of interacting individuals whose strategies are
subject to an evolutionary pressure. We then examine various extensions,
including how social norms may may influence individuals’ propensity to
engage in criminal behaviour. Also, we consider how alternative formula-
tions of the inspectors decision problem may affect the aggregate dynamics
of crime. Finally, we relax the restriction that individuals face only a bi-
nary choice between honesty and crime in order to analysis how our results
might generalise to scenarios where individuals can choose the extent of their
criminal behaviour.
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2 A conventional inspection game
In its simplest form, an inspection game is a two-player game between an
individual (i.e. inspected) and an inspector. The individual must choose
whether to violate or comply with the wishes of the inspector, who himself
must decide whether to inspect the individual or not. Each player makes
his strategy choice without observing that of the other. This situation can
be illustrated as the following 2x2 normal form game in Table 1, where the
individual is the row player and the inspector is the column player, and
the left (resp. right) entry of each cell corresponds to the payoffs for the
individual (resp. inspector).
Inspect Not Inspect
Violate −1, 1 2,−2
Comply 0,−1 0, 0
Table 1: The simplest two-player inspection game
The key feature of an inspection game is that the interests of the in-
dividual clash with those of the inspector. The inspector would obviously
prefer the individual to comply, but would rather not have to inspect. How-
ever, if the inspector chooses not to inspect, the individual would always
prefer to violate. As a result of this conflict, an inspection game contains
no pure strategy Nash equilibria: whatever the outcome of the game, either
the individual or the inspector would always want to switch their strategy
to something that would upset their opponent, who in turn would wish to
switch their strategy and so on...
This element of strategic indeterminacy is resolved by resorting to mixed
strategies, whereby at least one player randomises over his pure strategies.
In fact it is straightforward to show that the unique Nash equilibrium of
an inspection game involves both players choosing to play mixed strategies,
therefore implying that both inspection and non-compliance occur with pos-
itive probabilities.
To describe an inspection game in a general form, we use the following
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basic notations:
r =legal income received by the individual if he complies, r > 0
l =crimial profit received by the individual if he violates without
being caught, l > 0
f =fine paid by the individual if he violates and is caught, f > 0
c =cost for the inspector to inspect, c > 0
λ =the probability with which the individual is caught if the inspector
inspects, λ ∈ (0, 1)
In a general form of the inspection game between an individual and an
inspector can be described as follows: if the individual abides by the law
then he receives the legal income r, whereas the payoff to the individual that
violates depends on the strategy chosen by the inspector. If the inspector
did not inspect, the individual escapes with his legal income r plus criminal
profits l. However if the inspector did inspect, then the individual is either
caught with a probability λ and has to pay the fine f , or escapes with a
probability 1 − λ and the criminal profits l. The parameter λ can also be
interpreted as the efficiency of inspection.
Meanwhile, the inspector must incur the fixed cost c in order to inspect.
If the individual played Comply, this expense is sunk, and the individual
receives no further payoff. However, if the individual chose to violate, then
the inspector may catch the individual with the probability λ and earn the
fine f , otherwise the individual escapes, causing the inspector losses l. On
the other hand, if the inspector chose not to inspect, he sustains losses l
when the individual plays Violate, and 0 when the individual plays Comply.
This game is summarised by Table 2:
Inspect Not Inspect
Violate
(
r + (1− λ)l − λf,−c+ λf − (1− λ)l) (r + l,−l)
Comply (r,−c) (r, 0)
Table 2: a general inspection game
In order to ensure that the game can be interpreted as a conventional
inspection game, very often the following two additional restrictions on the
payoffs are imposed:
λ(l + f) > c (2.1)
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and
λf > (1− λ)l. (2.2)
Restriction (2.1) states that, given that the individual is violating, the in-
spector prefers to inspect since the expected benefit from inspecting exceeds
the cost. Restriction (2.2) states that, given the inspector is inspecting, the
individual prefers not to violate since the expected fine exceeds the expected
criminal profit.
The following theorem gives the unique Nash equilibrium of this game
and was proved in [42] .
Theorem 2.1. Let p ∈ [0, 1] be the probability with which the individual
violates and q ∈ [0, 1] be the probability with which the inspector inspects.
The unique Nash equilibrium of the two-player inspection game described in
Table 2 is the mixed strategy profile (p∗, q∗) with
p∗ =
c
λ(l + f)
and q∗ =
l
λ(l + f)
.
3 An evolutionary inspection game
In this section, we consider an inspection game with a large population
of interacting individuals and a single inspector. In this game, we do not
assume that individuals know all relevant features of the game and maximise
their payoffs accordingly. Instead, we will replace this conventional payoff
maximisation with the idea that individuals modify their strategies after
observing the experiences of others. The proportion of individuals who
play a particular strategy is then subject to evolutionary pressure over time
such that the population share of better performing strategies increases and
that of strategies earning lower payoffs decreases. We refer to this model
as an evolutionary inspection game. The key feature of this evolutionary
inspection game is that the transmission process by which the strategies of
Violate and Comply propagate is fundamentally social in nature.
3.1 Basic model of an evolutionary inspection game
Formally, in an evolutionary inspection there are N individuals, who choose
whether to Violate (V ) or Comply (C) and can periodically update their
strategy. We assume that the number N is large in order to make a contin-
uous approximation. We call an individual who plays V a violator and one
who plays C a complier.
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The fraction of violators in the population is
p : [0,∞)→ [0, 1], t→ pt.
The value pt, called the crime rate at time t, can also be understood as the
probability with which each individual violates at time t.
The fraction of the population that is inspected by the inspector is
q : [0,∞)→ [0, 1], t→ qt.
The value qt, called the level of law enforcement at time t, can also be
understood as the probability with which each individual is inspected.
The cost function of law enforcement for the inspector is
F : [0, 1] 7→ [0,∞), q → F (q),
with F (0) = 0 (that is, the cost of zero inspection is zero).
At any time t ∈ [0,∞), a complier always receives the legal income r with
certainty, so for any given level of law enforcement qt, a complier expects
the payoff:
piC(t) =: E[UI(C, qt)] = r. (3.1)
where UI(C, q) denotes the utility of a complier with any level of law en-
forcement q ∈ [0, 1].
At any time t ∈ [0,∞), if an individual violates, the infraction may go
unnoticed with the probability 1 − λqt and the violator escapes with the
criminal profits l; otherwise the violator is caught with the probability λqt
and punished with a fine f . Therefore a violator expects the payoff:
piV (t) =: E[UI(V, qt)] = r + (1− λqt)l − λqtf. (3.2)
where UI(V, q) denotes the utility of a violator with any law enforcement
q ∈ [0, 1].
At any time t ∈ [0,∞), roughly speaking there will be Npt violators, of
which a fraction of λqt is expected to be caught and 1−λqt to escape. Those
who are caught have to pay the fine f to the inspector whereas those who
escape cause a loss l for the inspector. Formally, at time t, the inspector
expects the payoff:
E[UA(qt, pt)] = −F (qt) +Nptλqtf −Npt(1− λpt)l (3.3)
where UA(q, p) denoted the utility of the inspector who has a law enforce-
ment level q ∈ [0, 1] and faces a fraction of violators p ∈ [0, 1].
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Inspector
0 Violate
Comply
Individual
1
(−F(qt )+ Nptλqt f − Npt (1−λqt )l, r)
qt
(−F(qt )+ Nptλqt f − Npt (1−λqt )l, r + (1−λqt )l −λqt f )
Figure 1: The extensive form of the evolutionary inspection game
The above analysis can be summarised in Figure 1:
In order to ensure that the game does not degenerate, we impose the
following restriction on the payoff of the individual: if the inspector inspects
with certainty, the individual prefers not to violate, i.e.
Assumption (A1) (1− λ)l < λf. (3.4)
Inequality (3.4) is the same as the restriction (2.2) in the canonical setting.
In an evolutionary setting, each individual plays V or C as a fixed strat-
egy for a certain period, and then periodically updates his strategy. At the
beginning of each period, some exogenous and fixed fraction ω ∈ [0, 1] of
the population can update their behaviour upon meeting another randomly
chosen individual in the population. If two individuals meet and have the
same strategy, then that strategy is retained by the updating individual. If
however, the two individuals have different strategies, the updating individ-
ual may revise his behaviour on the basis of the payoffs enjoyed by the two
in the previous period.
More specifically, at a given time t ∈ [0,∞), the fraction 1 − pt of the
population are compliers and ω of these are in an updating mode and called
compliant updaters. Among these compliant updaters, a fraction pt of them
then meet violators. If the payoff from violating exceeds that from com-
plying, i.e. piV (t) > piC(t), the compliant updater will switch his behaviour
with the switching probability
β(piV (t)− piC(t))
where β > 0 is appropriately scaled so that the switching probability lies
in the unit interval [0, 1] for any time t. If however piV (t) ≤ piC(t), the
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compliant updater does not switch. The coefficient β reflects the greater
effect on switching of relatively large payoff differences.
The fraction of violators in the next period is equal to the fraction pt of
violators in the previous period, plus the fraction of compliers who convert
to violators, and minus the fraction of violators who convert to compliers.
Formally the population frequency of violators, at time t+∆t (∆t > 0), can
be written as
E[pt+∆t] = pt + ωpt(1− pt)IV >Cβ(piV (t)− piC(t))∆t
− ωpt(1− pt)IC>V β(piC(t)− piV (t))∆t
(3.5)
where IV >C (resp. IC>V ) is an indicator function that equals to one if
piV (t) > piC(t) (resp. piC(t) > piV (t)) and zero otherwise. Since the popula-
tion is sufficiently large, we can replace E[pt+∆t] by pt+∆t and get
pt+∆t = pt + ωβpt(piV (t)− p¯i(t))∆t (3.6)
where
p¯i(t) = ptpiV (t) + (1− pt)piC(t) (3.7)
is the average payoff at time t for the population as a whole. Subtracting
pt from both sides of equation (3.6), dividing by ∆t and taking the limit as
∆t → 0, one gets the well-known replicator equation (cf. e.g. Taylor and
Jonker [62] or Zeeman [68])
p˙t =
dpt
dt
= ωβpt(piV (t)− p¯i(t)). (3.8)
This equation states that the growth rate of the fraction of violators is
proportional to the amount by which the payoff from violating exceeds that
from complying.
By (3.2), (3.7) and (3.1), we can rewrite (3.8) and derive a replicator
equation for the frequency of violators in the population, which is presented
in the following.
Proposition 3.1. In an evolutionary inspection game with a large popula-
tion of individuals, the replicator equation for the frequency of violators is
given by
p˙t = ωβpt(1− pt)(l − λqt(l + f)). (3.9)
In this evolutionary inspection game, the replicator dynamic (3.9) is not
a best-response dynamic. That is, at any time t, individuals do not adopt
the strategy that maximises their payoffs with regard to the prevailing level
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of crime pt and law-enforcement qt. In fact, individuals need not even be
aware of the overall levels of crime and law-enforcement. Instead, individ-
uals periodically meet with other members of the population, observe their
strategies, and consider updating their behaviour if they perceive that other
individuals’ strategies are more successful than their own.
The implications of the replicator dynamic are that although no indi-
vidual can be considered to be a rational payoff maximiser, strategies are
subject to the evolutionary pressure. In other words, strategies that are
successful in terms of yielding above-average payoffs will propagate through
the population by imitation. Therefore the replicator equation is said to be
a payoff-monotonic dynamic.
Next, we will analyse how the inspector responds dynamically to the
evolving level of crime pt, t ≥ 0. In this basic model of an evolutionary in-
spection game, we assume that the crime rates pt are visible for the inspector
and that the inspector plays a straightforward best-response to the visible
crime rates. More specifically, at each time t ≥ 0, the inspector takes the
crime-rate pt as given and tries to find a level of law enforcement qt so as to
maximise his expected payoff. Specifically, at each time t ≥ 0 and given a
crime rate pt, the inspector aims to maximise his payoff (3.3), i.e.
max
qt∈[0,1]
{−F (qt) +Nptλqtf −Npt(1− λqt)l} . (3.10)
Remark 3.1. One may think that this straightforward best-response strat-
egy is somewhat naive as it assumes that the inspector does not choose pt
strategically so as to influence future levels of crime rate. However, one can
also consider the situation that, perhaps due to political or resource issues,
the inspector may not trade-off non-best response strategy in the short-run
in the pursuit of some long-run objectives. At any case, this simplifying as-
sumption provides an interesting benchmark from which other assumptions
can be compared, see e.g. subsection 3.3.
Assumption (A2): The cost function F is twice continuously differen-
tiable and
0 < F ′(q) ≤ Nλ(l + f) and F ′′(q) > 0, for all q ∈ [0, 1],
where F ′ and F ′′ denote the first-order and the second-order derivatives of
F , respectively.
By assumption (A2), for each t ≥ 0, the maximum of (3.10) is achieved
only at one point. Let the unique best-response for the inspector to any
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crime rate p ∈ [0, 1] is denoted by
qˆ[p] := arg max
q∈[0,1]
{−F (q) +Npλqf −Np(1− λq)l}. (3.11)
Define
p¯ := min{p ∈ [0, 1] : qˆ[p] = 1}.
Clearly for p ∈ [p¯, 1], we have qˆ(p) = 1. Essentially, the assumption (A2)
requires that there exists a critical level of crime rate p¯ ∈ (0, 1] such that
if the prevailing crime rate is higher than p¯, the inspector will inspect with
certainty.
A very basic example of the cost function F in our setting is
F (q) = αq2 (3.12)
with a constant 0 < α ≤ Nλ(l+f)2 . In this case, the unique best-response for
the inspector to crime rate p ∈ [0, 1] is given by
qˆ[p] = min
{
Nλ(f + l)
2α
p, 1
}
which is a linear function in p. The critical level of crime rate p¯ is given by
p¯ =
2α
Nλ(f + l)
.
We will keep this example in mind in the following analysis.
Proposition 3.2. Let assumptions (A1) and (A2) hold. Then the best-
response function for the inspector
qˆ : (0, p¯) 7→ (0, 1), p 7→ qˆ(p),
defined in (3.11), is strictly increasing in p.
Proof. By the definition of the best response function qˆ(·) in (3.11), we have
the following first order condition
− F ′(qˆ(p)) +Npλ(l + f) = 0 (3.13)
and the second order condition
− F ′′(qˆ(p)) < 0 (3.14)
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are satisfied. Differentiating (3.13) with respect to p, together with (3.14),
yields
dqˆ
dp
(p) =
Nλ(l + f)
F ′′ (qˆ(p))
> 0
which completes the proof.
Proposition (3.2) says that the inspector’s optimal level of law enforce-
ment is increasing in the crime rate.
After having discussed the dynamics for both individuals and the in-
spector, we are now in a position to analyse the qualitative behaviour of the
system. Substituting (3.11) into (3.9), one gets that the fixed points of the
replicator equation (3.9) occur at p∗ = 0, p∗ = 1, and p∗ such that
qˆ(p∗) =
l
λ(l + f)
. (3.15)
Clearly, by the assumption (A1), qˆ(p∗) in (3.15) is within (0, 1). Since we
have proved that qˆ(p) is strictly increasing in p in Proposition 3.2 , the
solution p∗ ∈ (0, 1) of (3.15) is unique, we refer to this fixed point p∗ ∈ (0, 1)
as the interior fixed point of (3.9).
Theorem 3.1. Let assumptions (A1) and (A2) hold. Then
(i) The fixed points p∗ = 0 and p∗ = 1 of (3.9) are unstable.
(ii) There exists an unique stable interior equilibrium of the evolutionary
inspection game (p∗, q∗) with
p∗ =
1
Nλ(l + f)
F ′(
l
λ(l + f)
) and q∗ =
l
λ(l + f)
.
Proof. To analyse the stability of the fixed points of this system, we apply
the method of linearizing around these fixed points (c.f. [60]). Specifically,
define a function j : [0, 1] 7→ R by
j(p) = ωβp(1− p)(l − λqˆ(p)(l + f)). (3.16)
Let p∗ denote the fixed point of the system and ht := pt − p∗ be a small
perturbation away from p∗. The linear equation
h˙t = ht
dj
dp
(p∗)
is called the linearization about the point p∗. The important fact is that
the sign of djdp(p
∗) tells us the stability of the fixed point p∗, i.e., p∗ is stable
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if djdp(p
∗) < 0 and unstable if djdp(p
∗) > 0. Differentiating the function j(p)
(3.16) with respect to p gives us
dj
dp
(p) = ωβ(1− 2p) (l − λqˆ(p)(l + f))− ωβλdqˆ(p)
dp
p(1− p)(l + f).
At the point p∗ = 0, we obtain
dj
dp
(0) = ωβ[l − λqˆ(0)(l + f)] = l > 0.
Therefore the fixed point p∗ = 0 is unstable.
In order to check whether there exists an interior point p∗ ∈ (0, 1) and
to determine the its’ value, we substitute (3.15) into the authorities’ first
order condition (3.13). Together with the assumption (A2) we get p∗ =
F ′(q∗)
Nλ(l+f) ∈ (0, 1) where q∗ = lλ(l+f) ∈ (0, 1) . For the stability of this interior
fixed point, we have
dj
dp
(p∗) = −ωβλdqˆ(p
∗)
dp
p∗(1− p∗)(l + f) < 0
since qˆ is increasing in p, i.e. dqˆ(p)dp > 0 for any p ∈ (0, p¯). Therefore, this
interior fixed point is stable.
At the fixed point p∗ = 1, we have
dj
dp
(1) = −ωβ[l − λqˆ(1)(l + f)].
Since there exists an interior fixed point p∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that qˆ(p∗) =
l
λ(l+f) ∈ (0, 1), we have qˆ(1) ∈ ( lλ(l+f) , 1], by Proposition 3.2. Therefore
dj
dp(1) > 0, which implies the fixed point p
∗ = 1 is unstable.
Remark 3.2. The mixed strategy equilibrium (p∗, q∗) in Theorem 3.1 is
essentially the same as the one derived in Theorem 2.1, in the canoni-
cal setting. The main difference can be traced to the fact that the role of
the authorities’ strategy variable q differs in the two games. In Section 2,
the authorities faced a binary choice between inspecting and not inspect-
ing, and q simply specified the authorities’ randomisation between these two
choices. Given such a randomisation, the authorities’ expected cost of in-
spection would be cq, which amounts to a linear cost function with constant
marginal costs c. In the evolutionary model, however, q is interpreted as a
continuous choice variable with a more general cost function F (q) for which
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equilibrium marginal costs are F ′(q∗). Comparing the expressions for p∗
and q∗ in Theorem 2.1 and Theorem 3.1, we can therefore see that their
interpretations are essentially the same.
3.2 Crime and social norms
The key feature of an evolutionary inspection game is that the process of
individual behavioural change is fundamentally social in nature. Given this
position, it is not difficult to imagine applications where other social factors
may also exert an influence on individuals’ decisions.
Abiding by the law is a social norm but the strength of this norm depends
on the size of the population share that adheres to the law. A very low
overall crime rate helps to foster a culture of honesty in the population which
serves to reinforce individuals’ sense of moral responsibility. Conversely if
crime is rife, individuals may begin to feel that breaking the law is socially
acceptable.
In this subsection, we will incorporate social norms into our model and
analyse how social norms may influence individuals’ propensity to engage
in criminal behaviour. Inspired by the work [44], we model social influence
as the degree of disutility (or discomfort) experienced by an individual from
choosing a dishonest action. The larger the share of the population that is
law-abiding, the more intense is the social discomfort from crime. Therefore
the intensity of the social norm is determined endogenously in the model
and the degree of disutility is a function of the share of the population p.
Formally, the disutility function is
g : [0, 1]→ [0,∞), p→ g(p).
The model described in the subsection 3.1 should be modified in the
way that the disutility g(pt) is subtracted from (3.2). Then the replicator
equation with social norm is given by
p˙t = ωβpt(1− pt)
(
l − λqt(l + f)− g(pt)
)
. (3.17)
As in subsection 3.1, we have the fixed points of (3.17) at the boundaries
p∗ = 0 and p∗ = 1. However, the fixed point equation for interior equilibria
p∗ ∈ (0, 1) now is such that
l − λqˆ(p∗)(l + f) = g(p∗) (3.18)
where qˆ(·) is given by (3.11). Define a function W : [0, 1]→ R by
W (p) = l − λqˆ(p)(l + f). (3.19)
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Assumption (A3) The disutility function g(p) is monotonically decreas-
ing in p. It decreases rapidly from a high to a low value at some intermediate
value of p, namely it takes a sigmoid shape (as illustrated in Figure 2). Let
g(0) = m, with 0 < m < l, and g(1) = 0.
l −λqˆ(1)(l + f )
0 1 p
W (p)
g(p)
l
m
Figure 2: The interior fixed points in the presence of social norms
The sigmoid shape of the disutility function g(·) captures the idea that
aggregate behaviour can encourage both honest and dishonest behaviours
at the individual level.
Proposition 3.3. Let assumptions (A1) and (A3) hold. Then the fixed
points p∗ = 0 and p∗ = 1 of (3.17) are unstable.
As a direct consequence of Proposition 3.3, there exists at least one stable
interior fixed point of (3.17).
Proof. Following the same procedure as in the proof of Theorem 3.1, the
dynamics of the system are now governed by:
p˙t = h˜(pt) = ωβpt(1− pt)
(
l − λqˆ(pt)(l + f)− g(pt)
)
. (3.20)
Differentiating the function h˜ with respect to p
dh˜
dp
(p) = ωβ(1−2p)[l−λqˆ(p)(l+f)−g(p)]−ωβp(1−p)
(
λ
dqˆ(p)
dp
(l + f) + g′(p)
)
.
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Then we evaluate this derivative at the boundary fixed point p∗ = 0 and
obtain:
dh˜
dp
(0) = ωβ(l − θ) > 0.
Therefore, p∗ = 0 is an unstable fixed point.
The left-hand-side of (3.18) for interior fixed points is the function W
defined in (3.19). The function W is decreasing in p, as it is simply a
linear transformation of the authorities’ best-response function qˆ(·) which
is increasing in p by Proposition 3.2. Consequently, the non-linearity of the
disutility function g allows for the possibility of multiple interior equilibria.
Rewriting (3.18) yields
qˆ(p∗) =
l − g(p∗)
λ(l + f)
= 1− g(p
∗) + λf − (1− λ)l
λ(l + f)
.
Since g(0) = m < l, g(1) = 0 and g(p) is decreasing, we have 0 < g(p∗) < l.
Together with the restriction (3.4), we have
0 <
g(p∗) + λf − (1− λ)l
λ(l + f)
< 1,
namely, there exists an interior fixed point p∗ ∈ (0, 1) of (3.17) such that
0 < qˆ(p∗) <
l
λ(l + f)
.
Therefore we have, at the boundary fixed point p∗ = 1
dh˜
dp
(1) = −ωβ(l − λqˆ(1)(l + f)) > 0
that is p∗ = 1 is an unstable fixed point.
Remark 3.3. The inclusion of social norms provides a mechanism for pos-
itive feedback. When the initial rate of crime is low, the social disutility
from crime is high (i.e. the social norm is strong), which encourages more
individuals to behave honestly. This in turn acts to further reduce the rate
of crime and strengthen the norm, and so on. Conversely, when the rate
of crime is high, the social norm is weak and therefore the process acts in
reverse.
Significantly, the presence of multiple equilibria allows us to conclude
that the inclusion of social norms implies that societies with very similar so-
cial norm and level of punishment can experience very different equilibrium
crime-rates if their histories are different.
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To illustrate this point, we will take a specific example of the cost func-
tion F and analysis how changes in the fine parameter f might affect the
qualitative properties of these equilibria. Let F be of the form of (3.12)
with α = 12Nλ(l + f), i.e.
F (q) =
1
2
Nλ(l + f)q2.
Then the best respond qˆ defined in (3.11) is
pˆ(p) = p, for all p ∈ [0, 1]
and in turn the function W in(3.19) is
W (p) = l − pλ(l + f). (3.21)
When p = 1, W (1) = l − λ(l + f) < 0 by the assumption (A1). In this
example, the solutions of (3.18) are the intersection points of the linear
function W (p) in (3.21) with the nonlinear disutility function g(p) with
g(0) = m < l and g(1) = 0.
Let’s illustrate the effect of fine changes on the equilibrium with the
help of Figure 3. We start with the situation that a society is initially at
a low-crime equilibrium p0 when the fine is f0 (corresponding to the line
W0). From this point, successive policy changes can allow the inspector to
take a more lenient view on crime, namely to decrease the fine from f0 to
f3 (i.e. move line W0 to line W3) without experiencing much increase in
the equilibrium crime rate, i.e. the equilibrium crime rate increases slightly
from p0 to p3. However, if the level of fine falls below the critical value f
∗
1
(i.e. the line W0 is moved above the line W1), there will be a drastic increase
in the rate of crime (i.e. moving from p∗1 towards p∗2) as the honest norm
is ’destroyed’. Moreover, undoing the policy change by increasing fine from
lower than f∗1 to f0 (i.e. by moving a line above the line W1 back to W0)
will not be sufficient to restore the low crime equilibrium p0, since by being
excessively lenient, the inspector has unwittingly fostered an undesirable
social norm. Therefore the level of fine must now be increased beyond f∗2 in
order to restore the population to honesty and to restore a low crime rate.
The bifurcation curve in Figure 4 summaries the relation between the fine
parameter f and the equilibrium rate of crime p. As a result, we conclude
that in the presence of social norms, seemingly minor policy changes may
cause discontinuous changes to the overall level of crime. Moreover, when
such changes in the crime rate occur, they are likely to be highly path-
dependent.
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Figure 3: Fine and equilibria
Remark 3.4. The multiple projection of the equilibrium curve on the axis
of the basic parameter of the model is a general phenomenon in real life. For
example, in economics Bowles [21] examined market’s instabilities of equi-
librium prices. In biology, one observes the situations when small changes in
drug consumptions can lead to basically irreversible changes in equilibrium
states of an organism, see e.g. [35, 36].
3.3 Forward-looking inspectors
Up until now, we have assumed that the inspector observes the crime rate
and simply plays his best-response level of law-enforcement at each time t.
In this section we revise this assumption by considering the optimal strategy
for an inspector who is more forward-looking. Specifically, we consider the
problem faced by an inspector who would like to choose the level of law-
21
f0 f1*	
 f2*	
f3	

p2*	

p1*	

p0	

p3	

Eq
uil
ibr
ium
 cr
im
e r
ate
 p	

Fine f	

Figure 4: Bifurcation diagram
enforcement whilst taking into account the effect that this choice will have
on future crime rates.
This can be analysed formally by replacing the static maximisation prob-
lem for the inspector as described in (3.10) with an optimal control problem.
Rather than optimising at each time t, the inspector now chooses an entire
trajectory of the law enforcement variable {q.} = {qt, t ≥ 0} so as to ’con-
trol’ the crime rates pt via the replicator equation (3.9). In the terminology
of optimal control problems, qt is referred to as the control variable and pt as
the state variable. The objective of the inspector is to choose the trajectory
{q.} (i.e. a policy of law enforcement) that maximises the total discounted
payoffs with an infinite planning horizon and a discount rate δ > 0. In this
subsection, social norms do not play a role in the game.
Formally, the inspector solves the following optimal control problem
max
{q.}
∫ ∞
0
e−δt
(− F (qt) +Nptλqtf −Npt(1− λqt)l)dt
subject to
p˙t = ωβpt(1− pt)(l − λqt(l + f)) := P (pt, qt) (3.22)
with an initial value p0 ∈ [0, 1]. The Hamiltonian function of this optimal
control problem H : [0, 1]× [0, 1]× [0,∞)×R→ R is written as:
H(p, q, t, µ) = e−δt (−F (q) +Npλqf −Np(1− λq)l)+µωβp(1−p)(l−λq(l+f))
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where µ is the dynamic Lagrange multiplier. By the Maximum Principle,
the first order conditions are:
∂H
∂q
(pt, qt, t, µt) =
e−δt
(−F ′(qt) +Nptλ(l + f))− µtωβpt(1− pt)λ(l + f) = 0 (3.23)
and
∂H
∂p
(pt, qt, t, µt) =
e−δtN (λqtf − (1− λqt)l) + µtωβ(1− 2pt)(l − λqt(l + f)) = −µ˙t. (3.24)
Next, we will manipulate (3.23) and (3.24) to eliminate µ and µ˙ and get an
evolution equation for qt. Differentiating (3.23) with respect to t yields
−δe−δt(− F ′(qt) +Nptλ(l + f))+ e−δt (−F ′′(qt)q˙t +Np˙tλ(l + f))
− µ˙tωβpt(1− pt)λ(l + f)− µtωβ(1− 2pt)p˙tλ(l + f) = 0.
(3.25)
Then we solve for µ˙t from (3.24) and plug it into (3.25). Together with the
dynamics p˙t in (3.22), the terms which contain µt are cancelled. Then we
get
−δ(− F ′(qt) +Nptλ(l + f))− F ′′(qt)q˙t = 0.
Hence, we derive the following equation for the evolution of qt
q˙t =
δ
(
F ′(qt)−Nptλ(l + f)
)
F ′′(qt)
:= Q(pt, qt). (3.26)
Equations (3.22) and (3.26) constitute a pair of first-order differential equa-
tions, which describe the optimal trajectories for pt and qt.
Theorem 3.2. Let assumptions (A1) and (A2) hold. Then,
(i) there exists only one interior fixed point (p∗, q∗) of the equations (3.22)
and (3.26) such that
(p∗, q∗) =
(
F ′( lλ(l+f))
Nλ(l + f)
,
l
λ(l + f)
)
(3.27)
(ii) the fixed point (p∗, q∗) is an unstable saddle point.
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Proof. The fixed points of the equations (3.22) and (3.26) can be found by
examine the nullclines, that is the sets of points at which both p˙t and q˙t
equal zero. In other words, any fixed point (p∗, q∗) satisfies that
P [p∗, q∗] = Q[p∗, q∗] = 0.
Specifically, let P [p∗, q∗] = 0 together with assumption (A1), we get
p∗ = 0, p∗ = 1 and p∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that q∗[p∗] = l
λ(l + f)
∈ (0, 1).
Let Q(p∗, q∗) = 0 we get
p∗ =
F ′(q∗)
Nλ(l + f)
∈ (0, 1) with q∗ ∈ (0, 1)
since by assumption (A2), for any p ∈ (0, 1), 0 < F ′( lλ(l+f)) < Nλ(l + f).
Therefore, there exists an unique fixed point of the system equations (3.22)
and (3.26), and the fixed point is at
(p∗, q∗) =
(
F ′( lλ(l+f))
Nλ(l + f)
,
l
λ(l + f)
)
.
(ii) The stability of this fixed point can be analysed by examine the signs
of the eigenvalues of the linearised system of differential equations (3.22) and
(3.26) (c.f. [60]).
Linearising the system about the fixed point (p∗, q∗) (3.27) gives:[
p˙t
q˙t
]
= A
[
pt − p∗
qt − q∗
]
where A is a 2× 2 Jacobian matrix at the fixed point (p∗, q∗), i.e.
A =
[
∂P
∂p
∂P
∂q
∂Q
∂p
∂Q
∂q
]
(p∗,q∗)
=
[
0 −ωβp∗(1− p∗)λ(l + f)
− δNλ(l+f)F ′′(q∗) δ.
]
The determinant of A is
det(A) = −ωβp∗(1− p∗)λ(l + f)δNλ(l + f)
F ′′(q∗)
< 0
since the cost function F is strictly convex, by the assumption (A2). Hence
the fixed point (p∗, q∗) is a saddle point. Since the trace of A is Tr(A) =
δ > 0, this point is unstable.
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Remark 3.5. In this work we concentrate on the case with strictly convex
cost function F (q). In the case where the equilibrium costs are locally concave
(i.e. F ′′(q∗) < 0), it is possible to show that the eigenvalues of the system
are complex, with a positive real component. Therefore the interior steady-
state is a spiral node; all nearby trajectories spiral away from the steady-
state. In this case, the precise optimal control is difficult to characterise
in general terms, and depends on whether there are any additional steady-
states at the boundaries which, providing they exist, will always be saddle
points. However at the very least, we can conclude that the spiral nature of
the interior equilibrium implies cycles in crime and law enforcement. These
occur because the concave shape of the inspector’s cost function encourages
’extreme’ levels of law enforcement. That is, the inspector hardly enforces at
all when crime is low as the average cost of enforcement is high. Conversely,
enforcement is relatively strict when crime is high as the average cost of
enforcement is relatively low. As a result, the inspector successively under
and over-compensate. Meanwhile, the instability of these cycles stems from
the fact that inspector discounts the future, therefore the optimal control
allows crime to get out of hand in the long run.
4 Inspection with continuous strategy spaces
In the previous sections, we assume that individuals can only make a bi-
nary choice between Violate and Comply. However, in many applications
individuals may be able to choose the extent of their criminal activity. For
example, Kolokotsov and Malafeyev [42] analysed the case of a one-shot
game between a tax authority and a single individual who can choose the
amount of tax to conceal from the authority.
In this section we will extend analysis in [42] on inspection of a single
individual by deriving the entire class of mixed strategy equilibria in this
game. Then we will proceed to show that this class of equilibria also applies
to games of population inspection.
4.1 Inspection of a single individual
An inspection game of a single individual with a continuous strategy space
has similar structure to the canonical game in a general form specified in
Section 2 (Table 2), except that:
1. the individual may now choose the extent of his criminal activity from
the continuous strategy space l ∈ [0, lm] for a given lm > 0;
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2. we assume that the fine levied by the inspector is proportional to the
severity of the individual’s crime, i.e. f = σl with σ ∈ (0, 1).
It is worth stressing that, in this subsection we keep the assumption that
the inspector chooses from the binary strategy space {Inspect, Not Inspect}.
The payoffs to the inspector and the individual in the inspection game with
continuous strategy space is summarised by the extensive form game in
Figure 5.
Individual Inspector
Inspect
Not  Inspect
lm
0
(r + l,−l)
(r + (1−λ)l −λσ l,−c+λσ l − (1−λ)l)
l
Figure 5: A single-individual inspection game with a continuous strat-
egy space
In order to ensure that this game does not degenerate into dominant
strategies, we impose the following regulatory conditions on the payoffs:
Assumption (A4) lm >
c
λ(σ + 1)
and λ >
1
σ + 1
.
The first inequality in assumption (A4) states that the inspector would
prefer to play Inspect when the individual chooses the maximum level of
crime. The second inequality in assumption (A4) states that the individual
would not wish to choose to commit any level of crime when the inspector
is inspecting (otherwise maximum crime is always worthwhile).
Under assumption (A4), it is clear that there are no pure strategy Nash
equilibria in this game. We shall search for mixed strategy equilibria where
at least one player randomises over his pure strategies. Let q ∈ [0, 1] be the
probability with which the inspector plays Inspect. We have the following
result:
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Proposition 4.1. Let assumption (A4) hold. In the inspection game with
a continuous strategy space [0, lm], where lm > 0 is given, the equilibrium
state is that the individual may play any randomisation over his strategy
space provided that the expected level of crime is l∗ and the inspector inspects
with the probability q∗, with
l∗ =
c
λ(σ + 1)
and q∗ =
1
λ(σ + 1)
.
Proof. Suppose for any probability of inspection q ∈ [0, 1], the individual will
only randomise over two arbitrary pure strategies, l1, l2 ∈ [0, lm] providing
that these two pure strategies yield the same expected payoff (otherwise
he would want to assign full probability to the strategy yielding the higher
payoff). By using the payoff table (Figure 5), we get
q[r + (1− λ)l1 − λσl1] + (1− q)[r + l1]
=q[r + (1− λ)l2 − λσl2] + (1− q)[r + l2].
(4.1)
Solving equation for (4.1) gives us the equilibrium probability of inspection
q∗ =
1
λ(σ + 1)
, (4.2)
which is independent of l1 and l2. This means, when the inspector plays
the mixed strategy q∗ given by (4.2), the individual is in fact willing to
randomise over all of his pure strategies l ∈ [0, lm].
Suppose the individual’s randomisation is given by some arbitrary prob-
ability density function φ(·). Then, in order for the inspector to randomise,
the expected payoff from playing Inspect must be equal to the expected
payoff from playing Not Inspect, that is∫ lm
0
(−c+ λσl − (1− λ)l)φ(l)dl =
∫ lm
0
−lφ(l)dl
which gives ∫ lm
0
lφ(l)dl =
c
λ(σ + 1)
:= l∗. (4.3)
Therefore, as long as the inspector plays the mixed strategy q∗ defined in
(4.2), the individual is willing to play any randomisation over all of his
pure strategies l ∈ [0, lm]; Meanwhile, as long as the individual plays an
randomisation which results in the expected level of crime l∗ defined in
(4.3), the inspector is willing to play any randomisation. If both players
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conform to these randomisations, the players’ strategies are then mutually
consistent best responses.
Proposition 4.1 implies a most interesting class of mixed strategy equi-
libria where the only constraint on the individual’s equilibrium behaviour is
the expected level of crime. Specifically, the individual may play any mixed
strategy provided that his average level of crime is cλ(σ+1) .
4.2 Population inspection with continuous strategy spaces
We now consider the inspector is responsible for the inspection of a large
population of individuals. Specifically, we assume that there are N individ-
uals, each of whom chooses a level of crime l from the continuous strategy
space [0, lm]. Let Φ(·) be the probability density function of the distribution
of crime in the population. The inspector chooses the level of law enforce-
ment from a continuous strategy space, i.e. q ∈ [0, 1]. The cost function
of law enforcement for the inspector F (·) satisfies the assumption (A1) in
subsection 3.1.
Then, given a rate of enforcement q ∈ [0, 1], the expected payoff for an
individual from choosing the level of crime l ∈ [0, lm] is
E[UI(l, q)] = r + (1− λq)l − λqσl.
Meanwhile, the expected payoff for the inspector is given by:
E[UA(q,Φ(·))] = −F (q)+λqN
∫ lm
0
σlΦ(l)dl− (1−λq)N
∫ lm
0
lΦ(l)dl. (4.4)
Proposition 4.2. In an population inspection game, if the inspector chooses
the level of law enforcement from a continuous strategy space, i.e. q ∈ [0, 1]
and each individual chooses a level of crime from a continuous strategy space,
i.e. l ∈ [0, lm], then any distribution of crime may occur in equilibrium if
the expected level of crime is L∗ and the equilibrium probability of inspection
is q∗, where
L∗ =
F ′(q∗)
Nλ(σ + 1)
and q∗ =
1
λ(σ + 1)
.
Proof. Following the same arguments in the proof of Proposition 4.1, one
can get q∗. This quantity q∗ corresponds to the level of law enforcement
at which individuals are willing to randomise over all pure strategies in the
interval [0, lm].
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Suppose the resulting crime probability density function is Φ(·). The best
response for the inspector can be found by maximising (4.4) over q ∈ [0, 1].
The relevant first order condition is:
F ′(q) = Nλ(σ + 1)
∫ lm
0
lΦ(l)dl. (4.5)
Setting q = q∗ in (4.5) yields∫ lm
0
lΦ(l)dl =
F ′(q∗)
Nλ(σ + 1)
:= L∗. (4.6)
Therefore, q∗ is a best-response to Φ(·) provided that the average level of
crime is L∗ in (4.6). Meanwhile, any distribution Φ(·) with the average level
of crime L∗ in (4.6) is a best-response to the level of law enforcement is q∗.
Therefore (L∗, q∗) constitutes a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
This class of equilibria is particularly interesting for population-level
inspection games, as it implies that populations with similar levels of law-
enforcement can exhibit markedly different patterns of crime. In some pop-
ulations, crime may be the preserve of a minority of relatively serious of-
fenders, whereas in others, moderate levels of crime may be widespread. In
terms of law enforcement, only the average level of crime matters.
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